Academic Entrepreneurship: The Roles of Organizational Justice, Championing, Education, Work-Life Balance and Identity

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Academic Entrepreneurship: The Roles of Organizational Justice, Championing, Education, Work-Life Balance, Identity, and Motivation

Abstract

The burgeoning literature on academic entrepreneurship primarily incorporates macro-level ideas and tools from fields such as economics, sociology, strategy, and public policy. Most of this research focuses on institutional, economic, and demographic variables from a macro perspective, rather than psychological variables and micro processes. The literature also tends to focus on formal, as opposed to informal, mechanisms of academic entrepreneurship. We assert that a consideration of various micro-level processes is also useful in terms of improving our understanding of the antecedents and consequences of academic entrepreneurship. We draw heavily on the organizational behavior literature to consider how micro-level processes, specifically, organizational justice, leadership/championing, education, work-life balance, identity, and motivation may be useful in explaining relationships between faculty members and the university technology transfer office. We present some preliminary qualitative findings that support this perspective.

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 in the U.S. resulted in a substantial increase in patenting, licensing, and startup creation at U.S. research universities (Grimaldi, Kenney, Siegel, & Wright, 2011). This commercialization of university-based research is often referred to by scholars as academic entrepreneurship (AE). The Bayh-Dole Act stipulates that university researchers funded by a federal research grant (e.g., university research that is funded by the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, or another federal agency) are required to disclose their inventions to the university. Research universities, in turn, have established technology transfer offices (TTOs) to manage the commercialization of university-owned intellectual property (Link, Siegel, & Wright, 2015). Successful technology transfer requires that faculty and university administrators (especially, TTO personnel) work together to patent, license, or start a new company aimed at commercializing an invention or discovery.

This rise in university technology commercialization has attracted considerable attention from management scholars seeking to understand the variables that enhance AE. Most of these studies have been conducted by researchers in three fields of management; specifically, entrepreneurship, technology innovation management, and strategic management. Academics in other social sciences, including economics, sociology, political science, and public policy have also made significant contributions to the analysis of AE (for comprehensive reviews, see Perkmann et al., 2013; Rothaermel, Agung, & Jian, 2007; Siegel & Wright, 2015).

AE scholars have exhibited methodological diversity (e.g., employing both quantitative and qualitative methods) and have examined AE in many different countries and institutional contexts. However, academic research on AE has not exhibited the same type of diversity with respect to levels of analysis. Most research on AE has been based on a macro-level orientation,

with relatively little research conducted from a micro/OB perspective (e.g., analyzing psychological processes). Our key point is that while many scholars have examined AE at the individual-level (e.g., empirical studies of the propensity of academics to patent-see Perkmann et al., 2013; Rothaermel, Agung, & Jian, 2007), they have yet to investigate psychological processes that may be critical drivers of individual decisions related to AE.

The Oxford English Dictionary (2017) defines a process as "a continuous action, or series of actions or events." Thus, when we refer to individual level psychological processes, we mean the within-person, largely cognitive, actions that influence decision making. We argue that a lack of scholarly emphasis on such processes has limited our understanding of AE. This is the case even though, as we will subsequently explicate, at least some AE research points to the importance of considering these processes.

In addition to limited investigation of psychological processes, scholarship on AE has largely examined only formal, as opposed to informal, mechanisms of AE. This may be due, in part, to the availability of systematic data on university-based patents, licenses, and startups, which constitute proxies for formal technology transfer efforts (e.g., benchmarking data collected on an annual basis by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) -- see AUTM, 2016). In contrast, data regarding informal technology transfer processes are not readily available in annual public reports, and thus, are difficult to obtain. No matter the reasons, a significant portion of AE may not involve the formal, university approved, mechanisms (Kumar, 2010; Markman, Gianodis, & Phan, 2006). Therefore, it is important to examine both formal and informal mechanisms of AE, as well as the psychological processes involved in individuals' decisions to use one over the other.

The purpose of this article is to begin a conversation aimed at achieving a more complete understanding of the antecedents and consequences of AE by examining individual psychological processes. We begin by selectively reviewing how macro-level research in AE suggests the need to examine such processes for both formal and informal technology transfer. Next, we show how six specific psychological processes in the OB literature can be examined within the context of AE, including both formal and informal technology transfer. Finally, we provide some qualitative evidence from an ongoing project funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF). Data from 30 interviews of faculty and TTO officials at two major research universities highlight the importance of psychological processes in AE.

ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP STUDIES WITH MICRO IMPLICATIONS

Psychological Processes and Formal versus Informal Technology Transfer

Before presenting a brief review of AE studies with micro implications, we wish to define some key terms that will be mentioned in the remainder of this article. First, our key unit of observation for adopting a micro perspective on AE is the *faculty member*. Throughout this article, we will use *faculty member* as a generic term. This term refers to all the scientists and engineers, including post-docs, who engage in university research.

Second, consistent with Snijders and Bosker (2012), we define micro-level variables as those that measure phenomena related to the primary unit of analysis for a given AE system. For these systems, we consider the individual faculty member (or other individuals engaged in research at the university), department chair or center director, or TTO employee to be the primary unit of analysis. These individuals represent the most basic level at which decisions of whether or not to engage in AE, as well as whether or not to use formal or informal AE processes, are made. Thus, when considering psychological processes, we are referring to

processes within these individuals. In contrast, macro-level variables are those that measure phenomena related to higher (non-primary) units of analysis. In this article, macro variables are represented by academic departments, universities, firms that work with universities, regions, states, and countries.

Another important distinction is the one between formal and informal technology transfer. As noted earlier, in the U.S., the Bayh-Dole Act requires researchers to disclose any technology that results from federally-funded research. Additional laws and policies have been established by other countries and states, as well as by each individual university. These regulations establish a specific path by which faculty and others engaged in university research are required to proceed in order to commercialize a technology. We consider formal technology transfer to have taken place when individuals have chosen to follow this path.

When individuals transfer technology via a different path, informal technology transfer has taken place. It is important to note that choosing not to follow the formalized path does not necessarily mean that the individual has broken any laws or even technically violated university policy. For example, a faculty member who advances a technology through research with a graduate student, gives the technology to the graduate student upon graduation, and then is hired as a consultant by the company that the graduate student starts based on that technology, has not violated any laws or policies. However, in such an instance we would argue that the scientist did engage in informal technology transfer.

The Role of the Technology Transfer Office

Unlike a corporate setting, which may rely on organizational designs that allow for an integrated and networked research and development group, faculty members are often disconnected from the research that occurs in other departments (DeSanctis, Glass, Ensing,

2002). As such, a TTO may serve to connect faculty members to individuals both within and outside the university. This important entity has become one of the most commonly studied aspects in AE research. Table 1 summarizes some of the most widely cited articles on AE, which have most frequently focused on the TTO or the university as the unit of analysis. For each of these studies (which are arranged in chronological order), we identify the unit of observation, the aspects of AE analyzed, the disciplinary orientation of the authors (e.g., economics, sociology, strategy, or public policy), and the article's key results. Consistent with the extant literature, the focus of the majority of these articles is at the macro/institutional level. However, as shown in Table 1, many of the article findings suggest that micro-level psychological processes may also have a significant impact on AE.

Insert Table 1 about here

A number of studies of AE have focused on the role of the TTO as an agent of the university. As noted earlier, universities established TTOs to manage the commercialization of intellectual property arising from federally-funded research. Faculty members who wish to patent, license, or form a new company based on this intellectual property are required by law and/or contractual obligations to work through the university TTO. We refer to this process as 'formal' technology transfer because the faculty member formally discloses his or her projects to the university via the TTO. An advantage of engaging in formal technology transfer is that TTO agents may be able to connect faculty with others who are involved in similar technology development to more widely exploit the knowledge base. Such an 'open innovation' approach

may lead to quicker technology transfer and increased benefits to all parties involved (Lichtenthaler, 2001).

Articles that examine TTOs typically focus on modeling and explaining TTO performance. That is not surprising, since until recently, the management and commercialization of intellectual property at universities were relatively new activities. Thus, there was substantial academic, practitioner, and government interest in identifying best practices and optimal institutional and public policies to support effective commercialization. Interest in performance and benchmarking issues has risen as universities expand their economic development initiatives and do more to promote entrepreneurship on campus and in the region surrounding the university.

Initial studies of AE also focused on two specific dimensions of commercializing university research: patenting and licensing. Few authors have examined university-based startup companies as a form of university technology transfer. As shown in Table 1, early articles on AE, such as Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003) and Thursby and Thursby (2002), employed a production function framework to assess the relative performance of university TTOs. Such an approach is expected, given that scholars involved in the initial wave of AE studies were trained as academic economists. Their chief purpose was to determine why some universities are more efficient at transferring technologies to the private sector.

Thursby and Thursby (2002) estimated a production function to show that the growth in university patenting and licensing can be attributed to an increase in the willingness of professors to patent, without a concomitant, fundamental change in the type of research that they conduct (i.e., a shift away from basic research towards more applied research). That pattern of behavior by professors implies that at least two psychological processes are relevant. The first involves

identity construction and importance. A professor's identity as an entrepreneur may not exist, or if that identity does exist, it may be subordinate to that of being a researcher or faculty member.

The second psychological process involves life balancing. When deciding how to balance their time and effort (e.g. work-life balance or role balance), these professors seemed to view AE as a very low priority. Thus, to encourage AE, organizations might need to examine how to help faculty construct, and enhance the importance of an entrepreneurial identity (see Brenner, Serpe, & Stryker, 2014; Navis & Glynn, 2011). Additionally, universities may need to structure AE activities in such a way that professors do not perceive it as interrupting their ongoing research, and thus, interrupting their work-life or role balance.

Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003) used stochastic frontier estimation to assess and explain the relative productivity of 113 university TTOs in the U.S. Contrary to conventional economic models, they found that variation in relative AE performance cannot be completely explained by environmental and institutional variables. Thus, these authors concluded that organizational variables must be critical, in terms of explaining why some universities outperform others. In order to further explore the role of organization practices in AE performance, the authors supplemented their econometric research with qualitative data from 55 structured, in-person interviews of 100 professors, university administrators, and local firms and entrepreneurs at five research universities in Arizona and North Carolina.

This research allowed Siegel et al. (2003) to identify intellectual property policies and organizational practices that can potentially enhance AE. Three key impediments to AE with strong micro implications were identified: (1) informational and cultural barriers between universities and firms, especially for small firms; (2) insufficient rewards for faculty involvement in AE, including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, such as credit towards promotion

and tenure, and (3) human resource management problems with licensing officers in the TTO, including a high rate of turnover, a lack of incentive compensation, and insufficient business, marketing, and entrepreneurial experience.

In a subsequent paper, Link and Siegel (2005) found that a particular organizational practice can potentially enhance technology licensing: the 'royalty distribution formula', which stipulates the fraction of revenue from licensing that is allocated to a faculty member who develops the new technology. Link and Siegel found that universities that allocated a higher percentage of royalty payments to faculty members tend to be more effective in technology transfer activities. Thus, organizational incentives for university technology transfer appear to be important. This finding was independently confirmed by Friedman and Silberman (2003) and Lach and Schankerman (2004), using slightly different methods and data.

Though the best practices that were examined by Siegel et al. (2003) and Link and Siegel (2005) are considered organizational level variables (i.e., macro), research suggests that they influence the behavior of the individuals who are responsible for initiating AE (i.e., university professors) through motivation and justice processes. For example, an increase in motivation through rewards and compensation has been associated with an increase in individual performance (see Gerhart & Fang, 2015). Also, policies regarding how rewards are distributed have long been associated with individual perceptions of justice, which in turn, have been associated with various positive outcomes such as organizational commitment, task performance and organizational citizenship behavior (see Colquitt et al., 2013). Thus, considering organizational practices, though important, represents only part of the picture. As these studies imply, an understanding of the psychological processes through which such practices translate to individual behavior is the other critical piece.

Formal Versus Informal Technology Transfer

Although there exists research on how contextual factors, such as economic or political institutions, may affect technology transfer decisions (Autio, Kenney, Mustar, Siegel, & Wright, 2015), in this section we specifically review the literature concerning how individual-level variables may affect technology transfer decisions. When working through the formal technology transfer process, AE typically begins with an invention disclosure by a researcher working on a federal grant. However, based on extensive interviews with academic scientists in the U.S., Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link (2004) found that many faculty members were not disclosing their inventions to the university TTO, figuring out ways to 'bypass' the university TTO, or were creatively bypassing the TTO even after disclosing inventions. This finding is in line with survey research by Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby (2001), and research by Markman et al. (2008), which documents that many technologies are indeed "going out the back door" instead of being commercialized through formal processes. Also, as noted earlier, many faculty members may be reluctant to engage in either formal or informal AE processes for a variety of reasons, including insufficient incentives and human resource management problems in the TTO.

Deciding to engage in AE, whether formal or informal, is a within-person phenomenon with important consequences. If a faculty member chooses not to engage in AE, even though she or he might have a technology that could benefit society, then their research activity (which is typically funded by the federal government, a foundation, or industry) results in little value to key stakeholders (e.g., investors, businesses, university, society in general). Also, the transferring of technology through informal, rather than formal, processes has the potential to deny universities access to potentially lucrative streams of revenue generated by successful technology commercialization. Though certainly influenced by macro variables, the decision to engage in

AE and to use informal technology transfer processes is an individual-level decision, and thus, cannot be fully understood without examining the antecedents and consequences of micro variables.

University-based Startups

TTOs are increasingly focusing on the start-up dimension of university technology transfer. This increase in startup activity has also attracted considerable attention from scholars in recent years. As shown on Table 1, most empirical studies of entrepreneurial activity at universities are based on the TTO or the university as the unit of analysis.

Although not specifically focused on universities, seminal articles by Lynne Zucker, Michael Darby, and various collaborators explore the role of 'star' scientists in the life sciences on the creation and location of new biotechnology firms in the U.S. and Japan. A star scientist is defined as a researcher who has discovered over 40 genetic sequences, and affiliations with firms are defined through co-authoring between the star scientist and industry scientists. Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) assessed the impact of these university scientists on the research productivity of U.S. firms. They measured research productivity using three proxies: number of patents granted, number of products in development, and number of products on the market. They found that ties between star scientists and firm scientists have a positive effect on these three dimensions of research productivity, as well as other aspects of firm performance and rates of entry in the U.S. biotechnology industry. It is interesting to note that the authors also discovered that some of these scientists resigned from the university to establish a new firm or kept their faculty position, but worked very closely with industry scientists.

The Zucker et al. (1998) study highlights the need to enhance our understanding of the psychological processes that make collaborations between academic and industry scientists

effective. For example, is the salience of an entrepreneurial identity (see Forehand, Deshpandé & Reed, 2002; Navis & Glynn, 2011) reduced in an academic setting, as opposed to an industry setting, and hence, are there fewer knowledge spillovers when faculty work in academic labs? Does working with industry provide higher motivation for star scientists to commercialize their technology, or does it streamline the process of commercialization, thus making it possible for faculty with low motivation to patent their technology? Do industry leaders inspire scientists to commercialize by presenting a picture of what the scientist could be (e.g., wealthy or famous; see Pratt, 2000), while academic leaders do not? It seems likely that industry leaders would champion commercialization, since such activity could yield a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Jacobson, 1992), while many academic leaders do not have the same focus, and therefore may not champion technology transfer. These questions have important implications on how to structure academic-industry scientific partnerships. However, micro-level research in the field of AE is necessary to address them.

Lockett and Wright (2005) examined the relationship between the resources and capabilities of TTOs in the U.K., and the rate of startup formation at their respective universities. In so doing, the authors apply the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991) to the university. This perspective asserts that an organization's superior performance is related, at least in part, to its internal resources and capabilities. Lockett and Wright (2005) used the resource-based view to distinguish empirically between a university's resource inputs and its routines and capabilities. Based on estimation of count regressions (Poisson and Negative Binomial), the authors concluded that there is a positive relationship between startup formation and the university's expenditure on intellectual property protection, the business development capabilities of TTOs, and the extent to which its royalty distribution formula favors faculty

members. These findings imply that universities wishing to spawn numerous startups should devote greater attention to the selection and development of technology transfer officers with broad-based commercial skills.

Findings presented in O'Shea, Allen, and Chevalier (2005), Lockett and Wright (2005), and Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2005) imply that universities and TTO personnel should select employees with experience in industry. TTOs that hire such employees can be expected to capitalize on this industry-based knowledge, which will enable them to be highly productive. However, these studies also suggest that TTO employees are focused on short-term financial gains, while faculty have more of a long-term focus. Thus, it would seem that effective leadership at the TTO and academic department/university level is necessary to provide guidance and direction to both TTO personnel and faculty. Additionally, it appears that educating faculty on the functions, focus, and capabilities of the TTO would also enhance the TTO employee – scientist relationship. In other words, micro studies may prove useful in encouraging the coordination and success of AE, which is inherently a collaboration involving TTO employees and faculty.

KEY PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Our qualitative analysis was driven by one primary research question: why do university scientists engage in informal technology transfer? To answer this question, we drew from literature rooted in organizational behavior. Because technology transfer decisions are ultimately dependent on the actions of the individual scientists themselves, our aim was to investigate the within-person constructs that may dictate technology transfer decisions.

As discussed previously, the AE literature reveals several areas that micro-level psychological processes may help increase our understanding of AE. Through a series of

interviews with individuals involved in technology transfer, we identified various micro processes that may be especially relevant to technology transfer. These constructs are based on preliminary data from our broader, on-going NSF-funded project. Below we discuss our data collection methods.

We conducted semi-structured interviews with 30 faculty members (e.g., individuals in life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering), department chairs, and TTO officials at two major research universities located in the eastern and western regions of the U.S. For these interviews, we developed a protocol of open-ended questions that were based on our research question regarding why scientists may choose to engage in informal technology transfer. Each interview was conducted by two of the authors, and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Data were collected until theoretical saturation was accomplished (Charmaz, 2014). All interviews were recorded and transcribed so they could be continually referred to throughout the data collection and analysis process. The authors engaged in initial and focused coding (Charmaz, 2014) to identify common themes that emerged from the data. The authors found similar themes across interviewees, and then discussed each theme in terms of meaning and theoretical grounding until agreement was reached.

These themes point to various psychological processes that influence faculty members' AE decisions and processes. Further, we found that many of the experiences of faculty members were reinforced by data gathered from leaders (i.e., department chairs) and TTO employees. It is important to note that the psychological processes identified in our study are by no means exhaustive. However, as stated earlier, the goal of this article is to begin the conversation regarding how such processes can influence AE at the individual level. Our hope is that this article will encourage other researchers, both in AE and other fields, to consider how micro-level

research can advance our understanding of AE, both theoretically and empirically. The remainder of this article utilizes the interview data to inform our understanding of how micro processes effect bypassing the TTO and informal technology transfer. Specifically, we provide examples of various micro processes that may influence a scientist's decision on how they engage in technology transfer.

Informal Technology Transfer

The formal processes of technology transfer focus on legal obligations and property rights. However, not all technology transfer is done formally. Indeed, as previously suggested, some faculty members find creative ways to circumvent the formal technology transfer process when attempting to commercialize (Siegel et al., 2004). One such bypassing mechanism is consulting. Consulting may allow for faculty to connect with individuals outside of the university system who will work to promote and commercialize their inventions. Prior research provides evidence linking certain variables with increased consulting activity. For example, as shown in Table 1, Link, Siegel, and Bozeman (2007) suggest that factors such as gender, tenure, and grant-related research contribute to the propensity of scientists to engage in such consulting activity.

It is clear that whether it is through consulting, or other means, faculty members do not always disclose their commercialization efforts to TTOs (Thursby, Jensen & Thursby, 2001). Indeed, Markman, Gianiodis, and Phan (2008) have documented that 42% of faculty members who patent have chosen to circumvent or bypass the university at least once. Our interview data indicate that methods for bypassing the TTO are often creative, and do not always happen before disclosing an invention to the TTO. For example, as one faculty member said:

> "*I know of some faculty members who have gotten so bogged down in the [formal technology transfer] process that they simply just tried to run an end around and take [their technology] out [of the formal system]. They basically frame it in a way that they*

> *hoped would be different enough from an invention disclosure that they already filed, to get it off the radar of the university [so they could] take it forward independently."*

Additionally, bypassing behavior may involve other individuals aside from the faculty. For instance, when asked about methods of bypassing, one faculty member responded:

> *"I also know faculty members who just won't patent anything. Flat out. [They say] If I have a good idea, I will give it to an undergraduate student because [university policies] can't cover them. [Undergraduates] can go off and do whatever they want. They literally bypass the whole system in a nutshell."*

Thus, it is possible to conclude that bypassing is relatively common among faculty members. These scientists or engineers often find creative ways to circumvent the formal technology transfer processes, and such circumventions are not always against either policy or law.

Interestingly, faculty who circumvent formal technology transfer processes, and thus engage in informal technology transfer, do not always do so intentionally. Research regarding *bypassing* underscores an intentionality to avoid appropriate university procedure on the part of the faculty who are trying to commercialize. However, we use the blanket term of *informal* technology transfer to refer to actions taken by faculty—regardless of intentionality—that circumvent the TTO when transfer technology. Thus, informal technology transfer includes intentional bypassing, as well as unintentional sidestepping of formal technology transfer processes.

There has been little theoretical or empirical research on the factors that may drive faculty to engage in various forms of informal technology transfer. We suggest that oftentimes it may be due to a communication breakdown between the university and its scientists or engineers. Such a breakdown may result from a lack of communication efforts from either the TTO, university leadership, or both entities. For example, when asked about TTO communication, one department chair stated, *"I just got an email very recently within the past*

week maybe about patents that looked boring, and I haven't read it." In order to study communication failures and other such reasons as to why scientists may either intentionally or unintentionally not use formal procedures when engaging in technology transfer, we look towards various micro processes of organizational behavior to help explain how and why individual scientists engage in either formal or informal technology transfer.

Examples and Future Research Agenda

The micro processes that we discuss below, and summarized in Table 2, are provided to show how micro processes, including justice, leadership, identification, communication, motivation, and work-life balance, may affect university scientists' propensity to engage in both formal and informal technology transfer. It is important to note the large role that the technology transfer context plays in each of these micro-level processes. The context of a study can be paramount to the study itself (Johns, 2006), and in the case of university-industry technology transfer, this point is especially salient. Below we discuss how, within the context of technology transfer, micro processes can lead to important outcomes.

Insert Table 2 about here

Organizational and Deontic Justice

Organizational justice is the umbrella rubric under which four different justice dimensions fall. It has received much attention as an explanatory mechanism of important organizational outcomes in the management literature (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt & Rodell, 2011). The basic idea can be couched in terms of social exchange (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, and Taylor, 2000). Specifically, when individuals perceive fair treatment on the part of an

organization, they will be more likely to feel an obligation to reciprocate by helping to further the goals of the organization (Lavelle, Rupp, & Brockner, 2007; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). Although a justice-oriented perspective of university technology transfer phenomena has yet to be explored, we believe that the justice-based, micro-level processes underlying the technology transfer context are very important.

The four, traditional justice dimensions shown in Table 2 include distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and interactional justice (Colquitt, 2001, 2012; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2007). *Distributive* justice involves the extent to which an individual's outcomes (i.e., rewards, recognition, and so forth) are perceived to be in line with the effort, accomplishments, and other contributions of the individual to the organization. *Procedural* justice pertains to the extent to which an individual perceives consistency and lack of bias in the determination of his or her attained outcomes from the organization. *Interpersonal* justice is in regard to whether individuals perceive that they are treated with dignity and respect by others. Finally, *informational* justice pertains to whether procedures and information is explained in a candid, timely, and individualized or personalized manner.

In early justice conceptualizations (e.g., Greenberg, 1987), an emphasis was placed on distributive and procedural justice. Procedural justice has been studied in the context of entrepreneurship, but not specifically in the realm of AE or university technology transfer. For example, Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) and Sapienza, Korsgaard, Goulet, and Hoogendam (2000) examined procedural justice in relationships between entrepreneurs and their investors. In the context of technology transfer, distributive justice might pertain to whether the faculty member perceives that he or she receives a fair distribution of rewards (e.g., royalties), perhaps as compared to what the greater university receives based on intellectual production. Relevant to

the technology transfer processes, procedural justice might involve perceived inadequacies (e.g., lack of timeliness) in how a TTO operates in relation to faculty. The interpersonal and informational components of organizational justice also play an important role. A faculty member might perceive injustice if he or she is not treated with respect by a TTO, or if reasons for pursuing (or not pursuing) commercialization are not clearly and thoroughly explained. For example, when asked if he/she felt respected by TTO employees, one scientist in our sample responded, *"I think it's respect, I mean I had to go to [a senior faculty member] just to get respect."* This faculty member went on to describe how her/his perceptions of interpersonal injustice made it highly unlikely that she/he would work with the TTO again, inducing her/him to consider leaving the university.

In addition to these traditional ways of conceiving organizational justice, in Table 2, we also recognize that a more recent, deontological perspective of justice may be relevant to AE (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003). In contrast to the above justice dimensions that stress the individual's personal needs or interpersonal factors, deontic justice emphasizes the role that morality and the needs of others (e.g., society as a whole) can play in justice perceptions (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Folger, 2001). Because deontic justice takes into account morality and the treatment of others, it plays an important role in understanding how individual employees are relevant to the implementation of corporate social responsibility (Rupp, Ganapathi, Aguilera, & Williams, 2006). Thus, we suggest that knowledge workers, such as faculty members, may be especially sensitive to deontological justice infringements (Sauermann & Roach, 2014).

To a large extent, faculty members work to further technological development in order to better society or the quality of human life. Thus, they may have a vested interest or sincere desire to see their ideas quickly put into practice through commercialization. For example, consumer-

focused technologies, such as self-service technologies, may elicit strong deontological motives from inventors because their ultimate goal is to create something that makes life easier for society (Bitner, Ostro, & Meuter, 2002). Sauerman and Cohen (2010) found that even Ph.D. scientists and engineers in the private sector considered the value of their research to society to be fairly important. Enthusiasm to see society use the innovation or technology or may engender frustration and weariness when dealing with formal technology transfer channels (e.g., TTOs) because the potential 'red tape' involved in commercializing their technology may be perceived as an unnecessary barrier to accomplishing the ultimate goal of serving society. In short, faculty members who are deeply concerned about deontic justice issues may attempt to circumvent TTOs by engaging in informal technology transfer. Interestingly, at least one TTO official seemed to support such attempts, stating:

> "*You know, in some sense, there is a theoretical argument here, because we are funded by the tax payers for the benefit of the tax payers. Is it really bad that a scientist went out through the back door and made a product that benefits society? What's the bigger goal*?"

Leadership & Championing Behaviors

The second micro-level process that we propose to be relevant to AE is leadership. Although leadership may be relevant at different organizational levels, we argue specifically that university department Chairs who take on a champion role may play an important part in faculty decisions to engage in technology transfer. Championing is defined as supporting or defending a cause. However, within the management literature, championing is primarily associated with supporting the progression of a new technological development or innovation (see Schon, 1963). Notably, most descriptions of champion behavior focus on the champions themselves, rather than delineating the behavior in particular. For example, Howell & Shea (2001: 15) define champions as "individuals who informally emerge in an organization and make a decisive contribution to the innovation by actively and enthusiastically promoting its progress through the critical

[organizational] stages." Similarly, Clarysse & Moray (2004) describe a champion as an individual who drives an idea and manages it all the way through completion.

With that said, different from the current perspective of champions, we argue that championing behaviors can be applied towards more than one project. Indeed, it seems strange that definitions of a champion are based largely on how an individual acts regarding a particular project. But at the same time, many of the descriptors used in these definitions involve traits and actions that would carry over to multiple projects or even towards a more encompassing cause. For example, since champions are internal entrepreneurs who take creative ideas and bring them to life (Tushman & Nadler, 1986), we assert that these characteristics of someone exhibiting championing behavior could crossover to more than just one project. In other words, we view championing in the context of AE to be a more generalized quality of the leader, specifically department Chairs.

There are several aspects of such generalized championing behavior that may be relevant to department Chairs as champions of AE. First, there is outward demonstration of efforts to advance AE. Second, there is an aspect of risk-taking in AE championing, since it may run counter to predominant academic norms (e.g., norms of publishing). In other words, the department Chair who champions AE may find him or herself having to defend policies and individuals that go against the grain of academic traditions. Third, to be an effective champion, the department Chair may have to network or form coalitions with others. That is, Chairs may not have the authority to push innovations through the university bureaucracy. But if they are able to involve others, such as Deans and TTO officials, then the projects that they are promoting are more likely to be moved through the system.

In a university setting where red tape and bureaucracy often surround the technology transfer process, we assert that having a champion could significantly impact scientists' attempts to commercialize their technologies. Although such a champion may exist in many forms, department Chairs inherently represent a position that is critical to the role of champion. As leaders of their academic units, it is their responsibility to manage and account for work-related activities of faculty members. Despite this assertion, department Chairs sometimes limit themselves in their championing roles due to lack of priority given to AE, busy schedules, or lack of information regarding their own faculty members. As indicated by this statement from a department Chair after being asked if any faculty in his, relatively small, department are engaged in technology transfer, *"I haven't really kept up on what folks are doing. I have only been Chair for a year. [AE] hasn't really been a priority; I've had other things on my plate to deal with…"* Table 2 presents some additional examples regarding the role of department Chairs as champions of AE. Note that these results are consistent with the findings of Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) (see Table 1), who found that the propensity of faculty members to disclose inventions is positively related to the propensity of their department Chairs to disclose. Accordingly, faculty members may role model their department Chairs in terms of disclosure behavior.

University Communication and Educational Efforts

Another micro-level process that may influence AE is TTO communication and education efforts. We argue that the extent to which the TTO attempts to educate faculty members regarding formal mechanisms of technology transfer is a faculty member's decision to pursue commercialization, as well as what path (e.g., formal or informal) they use for this pursuit. We define educational efforts as actions undertaken by the TTO to increase awareness of the office and its services. Such education emphasizes the notion that innovation and

commercialization of intellectual property are important to the university and underscore the need for a balance between research and commercial goals (Pilegaard, Moroz, & Neergaard, 2010). This, in turn, may aid in creating a mutual understanding that technological discoveries on the part of faculty should be shared, and potentially commercialized, within the bounds of formal mechanisms of the university.

We recognize that TTO educational campaigns are formulated at the university level (most TTOs are university-wide entities). However, such efforts may also lend themselves toward being a behaviorally-oriented, micro-level process, since such initiatives are implemented by individuals. Fundamental to technology transfer is the two-way communication, understanding, and negotiation that exist between the inventor or scientist on the one hand, and representatives of the receiving organization on the other (Rogers, 2002). Despite the necessity of this two-way communication, there may be a breakdown in the flow of information between one or both entities. Specifically, a faculty member may participate in informal technology transfer because he or she is unaware of the TTO and the full range of its services, or because of poor communication experiences with individuals associated with the TTO. As one faculty member stated:

> *"…the problem is that for many [faculty members], we're in our little silos. You know, we're in our little cubby holes in terms of what we do. There's no pro-active encouragement whatsoever from tech transfer or any other [university] office..."*

Unfortunately, this was not an uncommon sentiment. We found that a lack of information or even miscommunication is prevalent between faculty members and the TTO. Furthermore, this two-way communication between the faculty member and the university may be hampered by biases that a faculty member may have when it comes to innovation and involving outside sources. Such biases in the context for innovation knowledge may be due to the faculty

member's perception of TTO agents as 'outsiders' who have little value to add (Antons & Piller, 2015).

Work-life and Role Balance

We identify issues surrounding work-life and multiple role balancing as a third set of micro processes that may affect technology transfer in a university setting. Work-life balance generally refers to organizational support for aspects of an employee's personal life, such as flexible work hours, dependent care, and family/personal leave (Estes & Michael, 2005; Beauregard & Henry, 2009). This subject has a strong presence in the OB literature, and prior research has elicited organizational changes that support a better balance between work and personal responsibilities. For example, many organizations have implemented policies such as family-leave programs, job sharing, and on-site childcare in order to offer their employees more personal support. Although issues of work-life balance have long plagued organizations, we assert that such issues are especially salient in the context of university-industry technology transfer.

In 1977, Kanter stated that having 'separate worlds' between work and personal life is a myth, as the two are unavoidably connected. Today, the workforce deals with this issue even more as technology has brought about boundaryless organizations (Kreiner, Hollensbe, & Sheep, 2009). Though such connectedness may have made certain aspect of work easier, unintended consequences such as the toll of managing multiple emotional roles between home and the workplace may adversely affect employees (Wharton & Erikson, 1993). Furthermore, the shift of household and childrearing responsibilities from female-centered to a model that leans towards greater shared responsibilities introduces various new complexities as to how fatherhood affects

the workplace (Ladge, Humberd, Watkins, & Harrington, 2015). In a similar vein, balancing issues may also arise as individuals struggle to balance their work roles.

As a unique type of knowledge workers, faculty members are placed in a position where they not only have to manage their personal lives with respect to their work responsibilities, but they have to also manage the different roles within their work responsibilities. A faculty member may be a professor, researcher, teacher, inventor, and entrepreneur and these roles may conflict with one another. Adding to this burden is the reality that faculty members are complex, in terms of identification (discussed further below) and levels of organizational commitment (Benson & Brown, 2007). For example, faculty members are typically more committed to their academic field than their department or university. As one of our interviewees put it, *"…it's really a question of when you go to develop the technology and commercialize it. That becomes difficult in conjunction with being a full-time academic."* Several faculty members stated that they would not give up research in order to pursue patenting, licensing, or start a company. A statement representative of this sentiment is:

> *"… there really is no way to… be a full time faculty member, and be president of a company. In fact, those two activities are not compatible. So you either need to take a leave of absence from your academic position, or you need to find somebody else to run your company."*

Identity and Identification

Identity is "a self-referential description that provides contextually appropriate answers to the question "Who am I?" or "Who are we?" (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008: 327), and has been conceptualized on at least three different levels. Personal identity is "a person's unique sense of self" (Postmes & Jetten, 2006: 260). Social identity involves defining oneself in terms of different groups to which one may belong (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). An example of this would be a faculty member defining her or his self as part of the 'Generic Research Team'. Indeed, even defining oneself as a faculty member is a social identity because one's sense of self is, in part, dependent upon the perceived characteristics

represented by the group ‘scientist’. Finally, organizational identity (Whetten, 2006) involves how individuals perceive themselves in terms of the collective or their role within an organization (Ashforth et al., 2008). For example, both a faculty member and TTO employee may say “We are ABC University.” In so doing, they would be expressing a shared organizational identity.

Identification is an individual’s “perception of oneness or belongingness to” a given target (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 21). Identification is different from identity in that identity involves a self-concept, and identification involves a cognitive and affective evaluation as to whether or not that self-concept matches a given target’s (group, organization, profession, and so forth) characteristics and attributes (Ashforth et al., 2008; Besharov, 2014; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). Perhaps the most prolific type of identification in the management literature is organizational identification (see Mael & Ashforth, 1992). However, like identity, identification can exist at several levels, with the work group being one of, if not the most, salient (Ashforth & Rogers, 2012).

Identity and identification both have the potential to illuminate important processes in AE. In addition to the implications in the macro literature regarding the need for identity-based research (see Table 1), our interview data also indicate the importance of identity. Of the themes that emerged from our interview data, the two most prominent are identity and motivation. In fact, in virtually every interview, these concepts emerged unsolicited. Perhaps the most frequent theme is that faculty members who were involved in entrepreneurial activities either before, or at the very beginning of their careers, were more likely to engage in AE. One faculty member, when asked why s/he was so heavily involved in technology transfer stated *“So, I have been an entrepreneur since my PhD thesis. My PhD thesis spun out the first company that I was involved*

with at [Research University].” This same faculty member later went on to describe his/her current identity by saying *“I’m a serial entrepreneur...”* These statements support other research in entrepreneurship that suggest previous entrepreneurial experience is an indicator of future entrepreneurial activity (Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005).

However, in the case of academics, developing an entrepreneurial identity before they actually start their academic careers may be critical, since academia often actively discourages entrepreneurship both formally (e.g., P&T criteria) and informally (e.g., organizational and institutional norms). It follows that even conducting the type of applied research that might lead to entrepreneurial opportunities would be eschewed. As one faculty member put it: *“But by and large, in our training we're not encouraged to invent anything because that requires that you focus on applied research as opposed to basic research...”* Indeed, there seems to be a general assumption embedded at some research universities that academics simply do not want to engage in entrepreneurial activity. One senior university official, when asked about faculty members’ desire to become entrepreneurs, went so far as to say *“I think they’re faculty members for a reason and… they want to remain faculty members”,* thus indicating his or her perception that faculty members are largely not interested in becoming entrepreneurs.

Research suggests that, at least to some extent, the groups and organizations in which individuals work help shape their identity (Tajfel, 1978). Given the negative, or at best neutral, perception of entrepreneurial activity by academic units within universities, it seems unlikely that such an identity will be developed (if it is not already there) once faculty members begin their academic careers. However, this lack of identification is in direct conflict with the intentions of the Bayh-Dole Act and most universities’ policies regarding AE. To address this issue, research is needed that answers questions such as: How can academic departments actively

build entrepreneurial identities among faculty members? How can new faculty members' entrepreneurial identity be strengthened? What factors will encourage faculty who do not have an entrepreneurial identity to still engage in AE? In short, micro-level research is needed to help build, maintain, or mitigate a lack of entrepreneurial identification among academic scientists.

Motivation

Generally, motivation is considered to be "a set of energetic forces that originate both within as well as beyond an individual's being" that determine the intensity and duration of behavior (Pinder, 1998: 11). Motivation has been categorized in various ways (see Latham & Pinder, 2005 for a review), with perhaps the most common categorization being intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation (see Gerhart & Fang, 2015). Extrinsic motivation involves behavior that is related to the attainment of some separable outcome (Deci & Ryan, 2000). For example, the less risky possibility of financial gain in the form of a share of the royalties from a licensing agreement may encourage TTO officials to push scientists to license technology, as opposed to the more risky act of starting a company. This may be one reason why Markman et al. (2005) found that universities focus on short-term cash maximization. Indeed, it may not be the university itself with such a focus, but instead the individual TTO employees who would prefer a quick, and relatively certain, payout that can be had through licensing instead of waiting to see if a business becomes profitable. However, it is not possible to extract such details using a macro approach to AE research.

Intrinsic motivation involves behavior that is done because there is inherent satisfaction in the behavior itself (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Almost every faculty member we interviewed indicated that this is their primary form of motivation for both becoming an academic, and engaging in AE. As one faculty member expressed it:

> *"So I think a lot of our motivation… we have a device that can help people. There are people dying in Africa from diseases we could treat, but we don't have the kind of assessment out there that's needed. So, working on [commercializing this invention] — I think a lot of the motivation is just in that realm, [rather] than trying to make money."*

Interestingly, the vast majority of faculty members had the perception that TTO and other university officials were extrinsically motivated to engage in AE. In other words, faculty members perceived that TTO employees helped them patent, license, or start a company almost exclusively because the employee and the university made money from doing so. This perception is perhaps best seen in the following statement from a faculty member:

> *"I think it's a lot about money. Sometimes [faculty members] feel like the tech transfer [office] wants their money… That's what it is to them. It's a business deal and the people up high, they don't look at the faces of the [faculty], they don't look at the small businesses. They say that oh this will cost this, this will cost this, and that's it. That's what I've been told by a lot of people."*

TTO personnel confirmed this perception. For example, one senior TTO official stated:

> *"So most Tech Transfer Offices [if you] say… give us your mission statement, or, what are you trying to do? Most will say, well, we're there to protect intellectual property and basically to bring in money to the university."*

The majority of TTO employees and faculty members believe that, strictly from a motivational perspective, formal technology transfer is better than informal technology transfer because it generates additional revenue for the university (which, according to the Bayh-Dole Act, should be "re-invested" in academic research). However, there were some divergent views that indicated informal technology transfer may actually generate even more revenue. These individuals gave two main reasons for their view. First, informal processes (e.g., working with private equity and venture capital firms) were perceived to be more efficient. Thus, the process of patenting, licensing, and startups would happen faster and have a greater chance of success. Second, because of the perception that the informal route had a greater chance of success, there was a better chance that the inventors would gain wealth and then donate money to the

university. One TTO official sums this up by saying *"There is a train of thought in … Tech Transfer Offices, we don't mind if people go out through the back door, because if they make a lot of money, they tend to give the money back to the university."*

The above ideas and quotes highlight several areas in AE that are in need of micro-level research. First, how does the interplay between the primarily intrinsic motivation of scientists and extrinsic motivation of TTO employees affect their interaction as an entrepreneurial team? Since receiving external rewards for intrinsically motivated activities may reduce an individual's intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999), it is possible that working with the university TTO may actually hinder future AE by academics. Research regarding the interpersonal relationships of faculty and TTO employees is needed to illuminate this issue.

Second, does the external motivation of TTO employees result in a larger number of patents at the expense of fewer startup companies? We encourage researchers to investigate TTO employees who are intrinsically motivated (e.g., want to help society), as well as those who are extrinsically motivated by money. Such efforts may reveal any differences in both their short-term production of patents versus spin-off companies, and their long-term revenue generation for the university.

Finally, it is important to investigate the attitudes and behavior of senior TTO and university officials. If, as one official indicated, it is more profitable for the university to let individuals engage in informal technology transfer, then perhaps policies preventing this should be changed, and TTO officials should be selected based upon these attitudes and beliefs. If, however, the conventional view of requiring faculty to go through formal technology transfer processes is more beneficial, then personnel selection and/or leadership processes may need to be

changed in order to ensure congruence between the university's and TTO's intentions and practices.

Conclusions and Discussion

According to Zahra and Wright (2011), we need additional research on AE, given its important managerial and public policy implications. As noted by Siegel and Wright (2015), many studies of TTOs, and the AE literature in general, have focused on university-level data. Those that have been based on individual-level data have not focused on key psychological processes, as addressed in the organizational behavior literature. We have shown that there are several micro-level processes that can enhance our understanding of the antecedents and consequences of AE, including the decision to engage in informal technology transfer.

These micro-level processes include organizational justice, leadership/championing, education, work-life balance, identity, and motivation. To understand how these factors can influence AE, we have drawn heavily on the organizational behavior literature and applied these psychological concepts to faculty members. A better understanding of the psychological processes of faculty members who are involved in AE will enable senior university officials to shape policy in such a way that encourages faculty members to both engage in AE, and to do so using formal processes. Another benefit of our study is that we have shed greater light on informal technology transfer, an area of AE that has not generated sufficient attention in the academic literature on this topic.

Unfortunately, the paucity of research regarding psychological processes involved in AE precludes our understanding regarding faculty members' decisions to either bypass the university TTO when engaging in AE, or to not engage in any type of commercialization of university-based research. At a time when many universities are aggressively promoting new initiatives to

stimulate AE (via both faculty and others involved in the research enterprise) this lack of understanding may lead to the implementation of either ineffective, or even detrimental, policies. We hope that the examples provided here demonstrate the importance and potential fruitfulness of micro-level, organizational behavior research in the area of academic entrepreneurship.

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TABLE 1

Selected Articles on Academic Entrepreneurship

Author(s)	Unit of Observation	Aspects of AE Analyzed	Disciplinary Orientation of the Authors	Key Results
Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998)	Biotech startups	Connections of these firms to university "Star Scientists"	Sociology and Economics	The location of star scientists predicts firm entry in biotechnology.
Bercovitz, Feldman, Feller, and Burton (2001)	University (TTO)	Patents and licenses	Strategy	An analysis of different organization structures for technology transfer at Duke, Johns Hopkins, and Penn State demonstrated that differences in structure are related to technology transfer performance.
Shane and Stuart (2002)	A single university (MIT)	University-based startups	Sociology and Economics	An event history analysis of MIT startups reveals that the social capital of company founders is an important endowment for startups.
Thursby and Thursby (2002)	University (TTO)	Patents and licenses	Economics	Growth in university licensing and patenting can be attributed to an increase in the willingness of professors to patent and license, as well as outsourcing of R&D by firms.
Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003)	University (TTO)	Patents and licenses	Economics	Qualitative data demonstrated that organizational practices explain a significant percent of the variation in AE performance, and that many faculty members are not disclosing inventions.
Link and Siegel (2005)	University (TTO)	Patents and licenses	Economics	This study found that higher royalty shares for faculty members are associated with greater licensing income.
Lockett and Wright (2005)	University (TTO)	University-based startups	Regression Analysis/ Strategy	The authors found that a university's rate of start-up formation is positively associated with its expenditure on IP protection, TTO business development capabilities, and the extent to which its royalty distribution formula favors faculty members.

TABLE 1 (cont.)

Author(s)	Unit of Observation	Aspects of AE Analyzed	Disciplinary Orientation of the Authors	Key Results
Link, Siegel, and Bozeman (2007)	Faculty scientists and engineers	Informal AE	Public Policy	The authors assess three types of informal AE by faculty members: knowledge transfer to industry, joint publications with industry scientists, and consulting. They find that male and tenured faculty are more likely to engage in all three forms of informal technology transfer, and that academics who allocate more time to grants are more likely to engage in informal AE.
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008)	Faculty	Invention disclosures	Strategy	This article finds that the propensity of faculty members to disclose inventions is positively related to the propensity of their Department Chairs to disclose.
Kenney and Patton (2011)	University	University-based startups	Public Policy	This article finds that inventor ownership universities are more efficient in generating spin-offs. Computer Science and Electrical Engineering generate more spin-offs than Life and Physical Sciences
Zheng, Miner, and George (2013)	A single university	Licensing agreement associated with university patents	Organizational Learning	An event history analysis of patenting licensing at a single university provides empirical support for an integrated model of organizational learning. Specifically, the authors find that learning occurs when both internal failure and success occur across levels. They offer a framework for multilevel internal learning from experience.

TABLE 2

Micro Processes Relevant to Academic Entrepreneurship

Micro Process	Definition in the Context of AE	Potential Impact on Academic Entrepreneurship
Distributive Justice	Whether faculty members believe that they are being rewarded (compensated/recognized) fairly	A faculty member's perception of the fairness of the rewards system may influence his/her propensity to engage in AE (both to initiate the process and to circumvent the TTO)
Procedural Justice	Whether faculty members perceive that they are treated in an unbiased and consistent manner by the TTO	A faculty member who believes that the university procedures are unfair may be more likely to circumvent the TTO and engage in informal technology transfer
Interactional Justice	Whether faculty members perceive that they are treated with dignity and respect when interacting with their Department Chair and/or TTO personnel	If faculty members believe that they are being treated with a lack of respect by university administrators (due to administrators ignoring them, or delayed responses), they may be more likely to circumvent the TTO and engage in informal technology transfer
Informational Justice	Whether faculty members perceive that they have received complete, timely information from university administrators	If information is withheld or delivered at inappropriate times, faculty may perceive this as unfair and possibly circumvent the system as a result
Deontic Justice	A faculty member's desire to see his/her research used in a manner that benefits society	Faculty members with a strong deontological perspective may be more likely to engage in technology transfer, but they may do so informally if they believe that formal technology transfer procedures hinder their chances of speedy commercialization
Leadership/Championing	A Department Chair may act as an AE champion if she/he takes action in promoting academic entrepreneurship and shepherding commercialization through the technology transfer process	If a Department Chair serves as an advocate/champion for faculty commercialization efforts, this may reduce the probability that faculty engage in informal technology transfer
TTO Education	Continual efforts by the TTO to inform faculty members of their services. This type of education is especially important when a faculty member is hired by the university.	If a faculty member lacks knowledge of the existence of a TTO, or lacks knowledge of services provided by the TTO, then he or she may choose to engage in informal technology transfer out of ignorance
Work-Life Balance	Whether or not a faculty member believes that she/he has an appropriate workload or work requirements relative	When work-life balance issues arise, a faculty member may choose to withdraw commercialization efforts, in order to spend more time on other activities

	to personal responsibilities and interests.	
Identity	Asking the questions of 'who am I,' which is especially important in the context of AE, because faculty members have many roles as a faculty member, researcher, teacher, inventor, and so forth.	If a faculty member's identity is strongly entrepreneurial, then he/she may be more likely to attempt to commercialize his/her invention.
Motivation	The impetus behind both faculty members and TTO personnel to engage in technology transfer efforts (patenting, licensing, startup companies).	Understanding what motivates faculty members and TTO personnel to engage in technology transfer, as well as how each individual's motivation interacts within a team, may point to specific structures and incentives that can help increase technology transfer efforts.